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Holding Investment Bankers Liable for Aiding 





Goldman Sachs’ first business principle states, “Our cli-
ents’ interests always come first.”1 Unfortunately, that is not 
always true for investment bankers—whether they are at 
Goldman Sachs or any other investment bank—when they are 
advising corporations, particularly in the trillion-dollar industry 
of mergers and acquisitions (hereinafter “M&A”).2 Investment 
bankers, or M&A advisors, are often given the opportunity to 
extract wealth at their clients’ expense, which creates a conflict 
of interest and incentivizes disloyalty towards the clients.3 
“Economists define a conflict of interest as a situation in which 
a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions adversely af-
fecting the counterparty.”4 This can be seen in the following: 
Bankers often have ties to acquiring companies 
and the parties financing their deals, leading to 
incentives to cater to the other side of the negoti-
ating table. An all-or-nothing success fee gives 
the banker an incentive to push for any deal at 
the expense of a good deal. And . . . sell-side advi-
 
 1.  Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Business Principles, 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/business-standards/business-principles/ (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2017). 
 2.  Andrew F. Tuch, Banker Loyalty in Mergers and Acquisitions, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
1080 (2016) (“M&A transactions are a major component of economic activity: in 2015, over 
10,000 such transactions, collectively valued at $2.3 trillion, were announced in the United 
States.”). 
 3. See Tuch, supra note 2, at 1080–81. 
 4.  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 27 (2014). 
WORLEY.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:47 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 32 
156 
sors have started showing up as buy-side lenders, 
importing an added incentive to get the deal 
closed on the buyer’s terms.5 
 
Conflicted investment bankers can harm the client by 
“lead[ing] buyers to pay more than they otherwise would or to 
enter into wealth-destroying deals they otherwise would avoid,” 
or by “lead[ing] sellers to sell for less than they otherwise would 
or to choose one prospective deal over more favorable deals.”6 
Put simply, when a director approaches an investment banker 
to advise him and his company on a proposed M&A deal, the 
investment banker will often advise the director to proceed with 
the deal, even if it would not be in the company’s best interest, 
because the investment banker knows if he says “no deal,” he 
will not receive any commission.7 
Economic damage to corporations and the corporations’ 
shareholders clearly justifies searching for and implementing a 
proper fix—one that sufficiently deters harmful disloyalty. A 
new solution, which has surfaced in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery through three recent opinions, is holding disloyal in-
vestment bankers civilly liable for aiding and abetting corporate 
directors in breaching their fiduciary duties to shareholders.8 
Some allege that “[e]ver since the Chancery Court’s polarizing 
decision in the Del Monte case . . . financial advisers have been 
sweating.”9 Albeit, the law is still unsettled.10 “In 2016, for ex-
 
 5.  Id. at 10. 
 6.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1081. 
 7.  Both corporate directors and corporate officers seek the advice of investment bank-
ers. Throughout this paper, for simplicity reasons, the term “directors” is used to encompass 
both the directors and the officers that operate beneath them. 
 8.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818 (Del. Ch. 2011); See 
In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 448 (Del. Ch. 2012); In re Rural Metro Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 63 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 9.  Matt Chiappardi, Delaware Chancery Cases to Watch in 2017, LAW360 (Jan. 2, 
2017, 1:30 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/874775/delaware-chancery-cases-to-watch-
in-2017 (italics added). 
 10.  See id. (explaining “[p]eople are definitely going to be watching how the law devel-
ops in terms of financial advisor liability.”). 
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ample, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of 
an aiding and abetting claim against a financial advisor because 
an informed, uncoerced vote of disinterested stockholders ap-
proved the transaction.”11 Therefore, even though the idea of 
liability for aiding and abetting directors may seem intimidat-
ing, investment bankers will soon learn of the nebulous applica-
tion. The test for civil aiding and abetting that must be satisfied 
before liability attaches is far too difficult to satisfy in this con-
text, which results in under-deterred wrongful behavior. Some-
thing must be done because leaving the market alone and rely-
ing on reputational governance12 also leaves disloyalty under-
deterred. Therefore, in the alternative, this paper proposes a 
better solution; namely, an indemnification clause in the en-
gagement letters between directors and banks. An indemnifica-
tion clause will impose a large enough threat of liability to suf-
ficiently deter bankers from administering self-serving advice, 
and it will be capped at a reasonable limit of liability, keeping 
directors’ disloyalty in check. In defending the proposition of 
contractual governance through an indemnification clause, this 
paper counters the other recently proposed solutions, such as 
the above-mentioned civil liability through claims of aiding and 
abetting, in addition to categorizing investment bankers as fi-
duciaries to the corporation so they can be held directly liable 
for breaching the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and 
its shareholders.13 To lay a foundation, Part II of this paper ex-
plains what duties corporate directors owe the corporation and 
its shareholders. Next, Part III presents the recent trends and 
opinions of scholars and the Court of Chancery. Part IV argues 
that the aiding and abetting approach is an insufficient deter-
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 207, 
212–17 (2004) (discussing the effect of market forces on sellers of products in the absence of 
liability rules). 
 13.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1085. 
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rent for investment banker disloyalty and why an indemnifica-
tion clause is the proper solution. Part V concludes this paper. 
 
II. DIRECTOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
 
First, it is important to understand what duties the di-
rectors of a corporation owe to the shareholders and the corpo-
ration to lay a foundation for understanding what exactly in-
vestment bankers would be “aiding and abetting.” The board of 
directors owes both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to the 
shareholders and the corporation. The duty of care and the du-
ty of loyalty both impose upon the board certain standards and 
responsibilities, and the Court of Chancery—through several 
important and key cases in corporate law—has described what 
these standards and responsibilities are.  
The duty of care encompasses ordinary negligence and 
gross negligence.14 When the board engages in ordinary negli-
gence (which is essentially just a poor business decision), its ac-
tions are protected by the business judgment rule, and therefore 
do not trigger liability.15 If, however, the board’s actions consti-
tute gross negligence, such as failing to properly inform itself 
when making an important business decision, it is a breach of 
the duty of care.16 
In practice, the board rarely faces liability for breaches 
of the duty of care because of section 102(b)(7) of Delaware 
 
 14.  See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996) (ordinary 
negligence); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del Ch. 1985), overruled in part by 
Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (superseded by statute 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7)). 
 15.  See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052–53 (“[The business judgment rule] in effect pro-
vides that where a director is independent and disinterested, there can be no liability for corpo-
rate loss, unless the facts are such that no person could possibly authorize such a transaction if 
he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their duty.”). 
 16.  See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893 (“[W]e hold that the directors of Trans Union 
breached their fiduciary duty to their stockholders (1) by their failure to inform themselves of 
all information reasonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the 
Pritzker merger; and (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such as a reasonable 
stockholder would consider important in deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer.”). 
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General Corporate Law (hereinafter “DGCL”).17 This statuto-
ry provision provides that a charter can eliminate board liability 
with certain exceptions, namely intentional misconduct, know-
ing illegal violations, and actions performed in bad faith (there-
fore applying to breaches of the duty of care).18 Although it is 
merely a statute that permits incorporators to include this ex-
culpatory provision into a corporation’s charter and still places 
the burden of enacting it on the incorporators, almost every 
charter contains it as if it were mandatory.19 
Because complaining shareholders that bring only a 
breach of the duty of care claim will not survive a motion to 
dismiss if the corporation’s charter contains an exculpatory 
clause, shareholders will nearly always couple it with a breach 
of the duty of loyalty claim. The duty of loyalty encompasses 
good faith, director conflict of interest, and transactions for 
control.20 A prime example of a breach of good faith is when the 
board fails to oversee employees by utterly failing to implement 
any reporting or information system controls or, having im-
plemented such a system, consciously disregarding its responsi-
bilities.21 Breaches of loyalty for conflict of interest transactions 
often occur in the M&A context when there is a director sitting 
on both sides of a transaction (along with failure to cleanse the 
deal by means such as establishing an independent committee), 
or in cases in which there is a controlling shareholder that en-
 
 17.  8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See Tuch, supra note 2, at 1143 (“Nearly all Delaware corporations take advantage 
of their ability under § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporate Law to include provisions 
in their corporate charters exculpating their directors from liability for monetary damages for 
breaches of fiduciary duty other than for breaches of the duty of loyalty or for bad faith con-
duct.”); see also In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 87 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(explaining that an exculpatory clause, like the business judgment rule, “promotes stockholder 
interests by ensuring that directors do not become overly risk-averse. . . .”). 
 20.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (good faith); Weinberger v. 
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (conflict of interest transactions); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–56 (Del. 1985) (change of control in the takeover con-
text); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) 
(change of control when sale of the company becomes inevitable). 
 21.  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 371. 
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gages in a transaction that uniquely benefits them or benefits 
them at the expense of the minority shareholders.22  
An example of a breach in a change of control transac-
tion is when the board’s defensive measures do not meet the 
Unocal standard, which includes having reasonable grounds to 
believe that an offer represented a threat to the company or the 
shareholders, and the board’s adopted plan was proportionate 
to the threat.23 Another example of a breach during a change of 
control is when the sale and break up of a company becomes 
inevitable and the board fails to get the best sale price for the 
shareholders.24 Or, as the court states in El Paso, the board fails 
to “squeeze the last drop of the lemon out” for the sharehold-
ers.25 The latter example is popularly known as the Revlon 
standard. “[The] Revlon review takes the court through all as-
pects of the deal, both the contract itself and the process that 
creates it. Anything that impairs sell-side incentives is a fair 
topic for questioning, including banker conflicts.”26 This is 
where investment banker disloyalty becomes relevant to direc-
tor behavior. 
 
III. RECENT TRENDS AND OPINIONS 
 
There are recent trends and opinions regarding invest-
ment banker disloyalty both by case law through the Court of 
Chancery and by scholars through articles, books, and journals. 
This paper first examines the Court of Chancery’s three recent 
and relevant cases in this regard. Subsequently, this paper ex-
amines the recent ideas and arguments posed by scholars. 
 
 
 22.  Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Williamson v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1663-
N, 2006 WL 1586375 at *4 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 23.  Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954. 
 24.  Revlon Inc., 506 A.2d at 182. 
 25.  In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 444 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 26.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 8. 
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A. The Court of Chancery 
 
Imposing aiding and abetting liability onto investment 
bankers is a fairly novel idea, and it is of high importance be-
cause it was not simply proposed by scholars as a hypothetical—
it is written into the opinions of three recent Court of Chan-
cery cases: Del Monte;27 El Paso;28 and Rural Metro.29 This new 
form of liability is causing concern on Wall Street and causing 
both investment banks and attorneys to watch how this area of 
law further develops.30 
In Del Monte, an investment banker at Barclays secretly 
and selfishly manipulated the sale process to engineer a transac-
tion that would permit Barclays to obtain lucrative buy-side fi-
nancing fees.31 On multiple occasions, Barclays protected its 
own interests by withholding information from the board that 
could have led Del Monte to retain a different bank, pursue a 
different alternative, or deny Barclays a buy-side role.32 The 
court specifically acknowledged that the harm was primarily the 
fault of the investment banker as it stated, “It appears that the 
Board sought in good faith to fulfill its fiduciary duties, but 
failed because it was misled by Barclays.”33 Nonetheless, the 
court stated, “Although the blame for what took place appears 
at this preliminary stage to lie with Barclays, the buck stops 
with the Board.”34 Therefore, the court held that the board 
breached its Revlon duties by failing to meet its oversight re-
sponsibility that would have checked the investment banker’s 
misconduct.35 In sum, although the court in Del Monte pro-
 
 27.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 28.  El Paso, 41 A.3d at 448. 
 29.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 63 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 30.  Chiappardi, supra note 9. 
 31.  Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 833. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 818. 
 34.  Id. at 835. 
 35.  Id. at 818. 
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posed the option of holding the investment banker liable for 
aiding and abetting, it ultimately limited liability to the board 
and reasoned the board could have—and should have—
prevented the disloyalty. 
In El Paso, the board of El Paso Corporation, advised by 
Goldman Sachs, decided to enhance the value of the corpora-
tion by spinning off one of its two lines of business.36 Kinder 
Morgan offered to purchase the entire company, and because 
Goldman Sachs owned nineteen percent of Kinder Morgan 
(which was valued at $4 billion), the board sought advice from 
Morgan Stanley on the Kinder Morgan negotiations.37 Howev-
er, Goldman continued to advise El Paso’s board on the possi-
ble spin-off deal.38 Morgan Stanley was incentivized by Gold-
man Sachs to engage in disloyal behavior towards the 
corporation because it could either approve a deal with Kinder 
Morgan and get $35 million, counsel the board to go with the 
spin-off, or pursue another option and get “zilch, nada, zero.”39 
The court acknowledged that “the key negotiator on behalf of 
the Board and a powerfully influential financial advisor each 
had financial motives adverse to the best interests of El Paso’s 
stockholders.”40 Nonetheless, even with the explicit recognition 
of obvious disloyalty, the court also acknowledged: 
[A]lthough Goldman has been named as an aider 
and abettor and it has substantial, some might say 
even government-insured, financial resources, it 
is difficult to prove an aiding and abetting 
claim . . . whether the plaintiffs could ultimately 
prove Goldman liable for any shortfall is, at best, 
 
 36.  In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434–35 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 37.  Id. at 434–36. 
 38.  Id. at 435–36. 
 39.  Id. at 442. 
 40.  Id. at 434. 
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doubtful, despite [the Goldman investment bank-
er]’s troubling individual failure of disclosure.41 
 
In Rural Metro, the shareholders sued “a highly com-
pensated advisor that hoped to generate $60 million in fees by 
inducing the Board to sell Rural when and in the manner it 
did.”42 The court stated that the investment banker’s advice 
“was overly biased by its financial interests,”43 and found the in-
vestment bank “liable for aiding and abetting breaches of fidu-
ciary duty by the Board.”44 The court also presented its ra-
tionale for the imposition of aiding and abetting liability, that 
is, “[t]he threat of liability helps incentivize gatekeepers to pro-
vide sound advice, monitor clients, and deter client wrongs.”45 
Furthermore, the court explained that the threat of aiding and 
abetting liability, 
[C]reates a powerful financial reason for the 
banks to provide meaningful fairness opinions 
and to advise boards in a manner that helps en-
sure that the directors carry out their fiduciary 
duties when exploring strategic alternatives and 
conducting a sale process, rather than in a man-
ner that falls short of established fiduciary 
norms.46 
 
The court applied the analysis even further by holding 
that “a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of the duty of 
care can be maintained . . . when a third party, for improper 
motives of its own, misleads the directors into breaching their 
 
 41.  Id. at 448 (footnote omitted). 
 42.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 88 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 43.  Id. at 93. 
 44.  Id. at 63. 
 45.  Id. at 88 (footnote omitted). 
 46.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 89 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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[fiduciary duties].”47 Even so, the court still acknowledged the 
difficulty of proving an aiding and abetting claim.48 
In all three of these cases, the Court of Chancery posed 
the possibility of, or imposed liability for, aiding and abetting, 
but there are some important and relevant differences among 
the cases. As will be discussed later in further detail, the deter-
mination of what relationship exists between investment bank-
ers and the corporate directors they advise is of high im-
portance in determining whether aiding and abetting does, or 
even can, apply. The determination of this issue differed among 
the cases. The court in Del Monte and El Paso leaned more 
towards a contractual relationship. In both cases, the court stat-
ed, “Delaware upholds the freedom of contract and enforces as 
a matter of fundamental public policy the voluntary agreements 
of sophisticated parties.”49 Conversely, the court in Rural Met-
ro stated, “Financial advisors provide . . . expert services. In do-
ing so, they function as gatekeepers.”50 Note, however, that 





Not surprisingly, after the Court of Chancery presented 
aiding and abetting liability in the context of investment banker 
disloyalty, strong opinions and propositions from scholars fol-
lowed. Andrew F. Tuch’s article titled Banker Loyalty in Mer-
gers and Acquisitions stands by the novel assertion that the 
proper classification of investment bankers is that they are fidu-
ciaries of their M&A clients and therefore required to loyally 
 
 47.  Id. at 99 (footnote omitted). 
 48.  Id. at 85. 
 49.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 840 (Del. Ch. 2011); In re 
El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 450 n.59 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 50.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 88 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
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serve client interests.51 Tuch defends this position by arguing 
that regulating the relationship by contract is difficult, expen-
sive, and uncertain, and therefore, the investment banker 
should be required to “act loyally in the absence of informed 
client consent.”52 Put simply, he stands for the proposition—
similar to Delaware corporate law53—that because every con-
tract is incomplete, the fiduciary doctrine should act as a gap-
filler in this context as well. He also supports his position by 
emphasizing the superior expertise and experience of invest-
ment bankers and how the bankers represent themselves as 
“trusted advisors.”54 
Although Tuch argues that investment bankers are fidu-
ciaries, which fits into the aiding and abetting test if true, he 
contends that aiding and abetting liability “is poorly suited to 
deter [investment bankers’] conflicts.”55 He defends this by 
framing it within optimal deterrence theory, which posits that 
“potential wrongdoers are optimally deterred when they expect 
to bear liability equal to the social costs they create. Potential 
wrongdoers are then led to avoid all intentional conduct that is 
socially harmful and to take precautions to minimize the social 
costs of accidental misconduct.”56 Tuch suggests that the opti-
mal deterrence could instead be achieved by “subjecting [in-
vestment bankers] to primary liability through direct causes of 
actions by shareholders for disloyalty.”57 
William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter together 
assert their own ideas in their article titled Bankers and Chan-
cellors.58 These scholars present their argument by explaining 
 
 51.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1085. 
 52.  Id. at 1083. 
 53.  See Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 853 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(holding that default fiduciary duties exist as “equitable gap fillers” even when they are not es-
tablished in the contract). 
 54.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1083. 
 55.  Id. at 1085. 
 56.  Id. at 1112. 
 57.  Id. at 1085. 
 58.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4. 
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their perception of how the banker-director relationship oper-
ates in realty. These scholars claim that “advisory ser-
vices . . . are grounded in relationships rather than discrete en-
gagements,”59 and that “bankers and their clients do not use 
their contracts to minimize conflicts and improve incentives.”60 
These statements seem to lean towards the fiduciary gap-filling 
contention, but that argument is never explicitly asserted. 
However, the authors present the Court of Chancery case Shoe 
Town, and explain how the court held that “[u]nder Delaware’s 
default rule, bankers owe no duties to shareholders and share-
holders accordingly have no direct action against a banker.”61 
They also distinguish the banker-director relationship from the 
lawyer-client relationship by explaining how conflicts in rela-
tion to lawyers trigger “red flags,” whereas conflicts in relation 
to business people, such as investment bankers, are simply 
“problems to be managed.”62 In regards to a solution, these 
scholars propose a “safe harbor for banker conflicts conditioned 
on full disclosure and engagement of a second, unconflicted 
banker.”63 
In the book Better Bankers, Better Banks, Claire A. Hill 
and Richard W. Painter take a different approach.64 The au-
thors start by identifying the prominent damage that banker 
conflicts cause on the economy: “Every month—if not week—
brings new reports of allegations, settlements, and, in some cas-
es, admissions involving the banking industry.”65 However, the 
banks’ shareholders typically pay the fines and settlements; the 
individual bankers rarely pay out of their own pocket and are 
 
 59.  Id. at 20. 
 60.  Id. at 26. 
 61.  Id. at 33. 
 62.  Id. at 26. 
 63.  Id. at 11. 
 64.  CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS: 
PROMOTING GOOD BUSINESS THROUGH CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT (2015). 
 65.  Id. at 2. 
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almost never put in jail for wrongdoings.66 The authors further 
explain the problem that “[l]aw has not sufficiently constrained 
bank behavior.”67 For example, in 2012, JP Morgan lost at least 
$6 billion due to one of its banker’s ill-advised and excessive 
risk taking.68 “Even where law is able to specify what banks 
should not be doing, enforcement is often exceedingly difficult: 
banks have many ways to obscure, if not conceal, what they are 
doing.”69 
Hill and Painter assert that personal liability will suffi-
ciently deter inappropriate risk taking.70 Therefore, they advo-
cate for “covenant banking,” where the “bankers [are] personal-
ly liable from their own assets for some of their banks’ debts 
and [where] they [are] personally liable from several years of 
their past, present, and future compensation for some portion 
of fines and fraud-based judgments (including settlements) 
against the bank.”71 The authors suggest implementing this lia-
bility by an agreement, or a “covenant,” between the banker 
and his bank.72 This would be a specific type of covenant—a 
personal guarantee—in which the highly compensated bankers 
would be asked to make a substantial portion of their personal 
assets available to pay the debts of the bank if it fails.73 
They claim this would help “instill a culture that dis-
courages bad behavior and its underlying ethos, the competitive 
pursuit of narrow material gain.”74 The authors explain that 
“different people should be attracted to the banking profession 
to begin with, people who would make banking less volatile.”75 
 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 42. 
 69.  Id. at 7. 
 70.  Id. at 146. 
 71.  Id. at 7–8. 
 72.  Id. at 8. 
 73.  Id. at 152. 
 74.  Id. at 8. 
 75.  Id. 
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They defend their “covenant banking” proposition by explain-
ing that it will discourage bad behavior successfully to the ex-




The recent trends and opinions mentioned above have 
several implications. As previously discussed, although the idea 
may be rightful in theory, the imposition of civil aiding and 
abetting liability onto investment bankers is improper because 
it will rarely, if ever, apply, leaving the investment banker un-
der-deterred from administering self-serving advice to the di-
rectors. First, it is not plausible to classify investment bankers as 
“fiduciaries” of the corporation for the board member they ad-
vise. Therefore, the “fiduciary” factor in the aiding and abetting 
liability test cannot be satisfied. Second, even if there were a fi-
duciary relationship and the imposition of fiduciary duties in 
this context, it is far too difficult to satisfy the “knowing partic-
ipation” requirement. Both of these failures in the application 
leave the disloyalty under-deterred. Next, because reputational 
governance is also insufficient to deter investment banker dis-
loyalty, which leaves the bankers under-deterred as well, some-
thing must be done to fix this issue. Finally, contract govern-
ance is the most preferable remedy for this issue, specifically an 
indemnification clause because it will provide sufficient deter-
rence for the harmful disloyalty. 
 
A. Aiding and Abetting is Improper 
 
Aiding and abetting requires four elements to be met 
before any liability attaches: (1) the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship; (2) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty; (3) knowing par-
ticipation in that breach by the defendants; and (4) damages 
 
 76.  Id. 
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proximately caused by the breach.77 Although it seems fair to 
hold the investment bankers liable to those who are harmed by 
the disloyalty (namely, the shareholders on behalf of the corpo-
ration), the innovative idea of imposing aiding and abetting lia-
bility onto investment bankers is flawed. The test for aiding and 
abetting liability is far too difficult—if not impossible—to satis-
fy in this context, and the court has explicitly acknowledged this 
fact.78 First, it is not feasible to classify investment bankers as 
“fiduciaries” to the director, the company, and/or its sharehold-
ers. Therefore, factors (1) and (2) of the aiding and abetting test 
cannot be satisfied, as they require a fiduciary relationship, im-
plementation of fiduciary duties, and a breach of said duties. 
Second, even if there was a fiduciary relationship and corre-
sponding duties imposed, the third factor of the test—”knowing 
participation”—is nearly impossible to prove. There are only 
certain limited circumstances in which it can be proven; there-
fore, in the majority of cases, investment bankers will be left 
under-deterred from administering self-serving advice. Con-
tract law—not civil aiding and abetting—creates the proper de-
terrent for the relevant disloyalty. 
 
1. Lack of fiduciary relationship 
 
A fiduciary is “[a]n individual in whom another has 
placed the utmost trust and confidence to manage and protect 
property or money.”79 Investment bankers cannot be classified 
as a fiduciary of the corporation or its shareholders. They are 
agents whom directors merely seek advice from. Therefore, 
 
 77.  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 838 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (citing Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001)). 
 78.  See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 62–63 (“The plaintiff must meet a scienter 
requirement, proving not only the existence and breach of a fiduciary relationship but the de-
fendant’s knowing participation in the breach. These claims accordingly are thought to be hard 
to prove.”). 
 79.  WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM. LAW (2d ed. 2008), http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fiduciary. 
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aiding and abetting liability fails to apply properly to invest-
ment banker disloyalty, leaving self-serving conduct under-
deterred. As Tuch explains, there are certainly public policy 
reasons for the existence of fiduciary relationships, such as 
maintaining confidence in the integrity of the relationship in 
which loyalty is expected and helping to reduce agency costs.80 
However, it is still not feasible to impose the fiduciary relation-
ship and its accompanying duties onto the investment banker, 
based on both the logic and the manner in which the market 
actually operates. 
The Court of Chancery properly stated in Shoe Town 
that “it makes little sense to strap those investment banks, who 
are retained, with the duties of a fiduciary,”81 since bankers 
serving only as agents are typically not deemed trustees and 
thus owe no fiduciary duty to shareholders.82 “Indeed, it escapes 
reason to say that an investment bank hired by a management 
group . . . would stand in a relationship with a given corpora-
tion and its stockholders similar to the relationship of a trustee 
to his cestui que trust.”83 Although these statements remain rea-
sonable, the Court of Chancery made them prior to deciding 
Revlon. Revlon gives shareholders a cause of action that Shoe 
Town did not recognize: a derivative suit—a shareholders’ suit 
on behalf of the corporation—by holding that a board of direc-
tors has a fiduciary duty of care and loyalty to its shareholders 
when approving a corporate merger.84 This is why the Court of 
Chancery has subsequently held that “a banker conflict that 
puts the sell-side board and its deal into Revlon jeopardy is ef-
fectively prohibited.”85 But it does not logically follow that just 
because the shareholders currently have a more accessible cause 
 
 80.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1101. 
 81.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 33 (citing In re Shoe Town, Inc. Stockholders 
Litig. No. 9483, 1990 WL 13475, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990)). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 47. 
 85.  Id. at 47–48. 
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of action against the director that they should also have a cause 
of action against the banker for aiding and abetting the direc-
tor. The Court of Chancery’s logical statements in Shoe Town 
should still be applicable. Director disloyalty and an investment 
banker should be viewed as two separate things, even if they are 
sometimes intertwined because the director is a fiduciary of the 
corporation and its shareholders whereas the investment banker 
is not. In the legal world where lawyers are fiduciaries to the 
clients they advise, disloyalty is not tolerated. Lawyers face dis-
ciplinary action in the case of a conflict of interest.86 “[W]hy 
should banker conflicts be tolerated at all in a world where no-
body would proceed with a sale process where the same law 
firm represented both sides?”87 Investment bankers are treated 
and viewed differently, so it is illogical and impractical to im-
pose the same duties. 
Furthermore, the realistic operation of the investment 
banker market undercuts the argument that investment bankers 
are—or even should be—fiduciaries. “Where an investment 
bank is providing a fairness opinion for long-standing clients, it 
‘may be influenced to find a transaction fair to avoid irritating 
management and other corporate actors who stand to benefit 
from the transaction,’ as ‘[t]his will ensure future lucrative busi-
ness.’”88 In theory, this would be true. The court in Del Monte 
stated that “Barclays and Del Monte ha[d] enjoyed a close rela-
tionship.”89 But long-standing clients are shifting away from be-
ing the norm. The investment banks are now notorious for 
high turnover because of the high-pressure environment.90 “In 
 
 86.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 87.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 7. 
 88.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 106 (Del. Ch. 2014) (cit-
ing Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1587 (2006)). 
 89.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 819 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 90.  See Robert C. Bird & Darren Charters, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination in 
Canada and the United States: A Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 205, 
247 (2004) (“[S]ome businesses by their nature suffer from rapid turnover (e.g., a high-
pressured investment banking position).”). 
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the high-pressure environment of an investment bank, the typi-
cal professional stays on the job between seven and nine years 
before changing careers or leaving for other areas of finance.”91 
In 2010, a private equity recruitment firm, PER, calculated that 
250 people joined a combination of Bank of America, 
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, and 
Morgan Stanley. After three years, PER reported that only 140 
of those people were even working in the banking field.92 
As banks have done progressively larger transac-
tions, and as some bankers have become more 
mobile—moving from bank to bank rather than 
staying with the same bank for their whole ca-
reers—much has changed about bankers’ rela-
tionships to their banks, and consequently, banks’ 
relationships to their customers and clients. This 
is especially so for those bankers who in a good 
year may make enough to live on for the rest of 
their lives.93 
 
The banks’ priorities are moving away from an emphasis 
on stable business practices and personal relationships and to-
ward aggressive new strategies for enhancing profitability.94 
Unlike the “family lawyer” or “family accountant” expected to 
act loyally even in the absence of a contract, the same expecta-
tion is not—and should not—be present for a director’s advis-
ing investment banker. 
 
 91.  Dawn Kopeckie, Young Bankers Fed Up with 90-Hour Weeks Move to Startups, 
BLOOMBERG MARKETS (May 8, 2014 at 10:01 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-09/young-bankers-fed-up-with-90-hour-
weeks-move-to-startups. 
 92.  Sarah Butcher, Nearly Half of Junior M&A Bankers at Top Banks Quit Within 
Three Years (Apr. 19, 2013), http://news.efinancialcareers.com/us-en/139375/nearly-half-of-
junior-ma-bankers-at-top-banks-quit-within-three-years/. 
 93.  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 64, at 103. 
 94.  Id. at 76. 
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Additionally, even if investment bankers were fiduciaries and 
therefore owed fiduciary duties to their clients, it is certain that 
neither banks nor bankers want to be fiduciaries. So just as 
most corporate bylaws do (i.e. by exculpatory provisions per 
DGCL § 102(b)(7)), the banks will simply contract around the 
fiduciary duties. And, as explained further below, the market 
will be no discipline to “weed out” the bankers that do contract 
around the fiduciary duties as opposed to the bankers that do 
not. The contract between the corporate director and the advis-
ing investment banker should deter, not enable the administra-
tion of self-serving advice. 
 
2. Difficult to prove “knowing participation” 
 
Investment banks and bankers have numerous “ways to 
obscure, if not conceal, what they are doing.”95 Therefore, even 
if investment bankers were fiduciaries and owed fiduciary duties 
despite the assertions above, it is far too difficult to prove 
“knowing participation” to sufficiently deter the investment 
banker from handing out self-serving advice. If investment 
bankers literally “aid” the directors in engaging in any of the 
conduct explained in Section III above, liability for aiding and 
abetting logically applies. For example, suppose a director sits 
on both sides of a proposed M&A transaction. If the director 
approached an investment banker and explained that he needed 
a fairness opinion to appear to satisfy his fiduciary duties, the 
investment banker would be “aiding and abetting” the direc-
tor’s breach of his duty of loyalty by approving the deal. The 
investment banker still has his own incentive to approve the 
deal so he can finance it, and if he says it is not a good deal or 
refuses to assist a conflicted director, then he gets nothing. The 
investment banker in this example is aware the director is 
breaching his duty of loyalty, satisfying the “knowing” prong of 
 
 95.  Id. at 7. 
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the aiding and abetting liability test, and the investment banker 
is aware that in approving the deal, he is assisting the director 
breach his duty of loyalty. This is a narrow circumstance, as it is 
usually much less obvious that the director and investment 
banker are acting in concert—if they are even acting in concert 
at all. And even though this situation contains wrongful con-
flicted behavior that is clearly punishable, it would be difficult 
to detect this behavior and prove this conversation occurred. 
This is why the Court of Chancery has explicitly acknowledged 
the difficulty of prevailing on an aiding and abetting claim.96 
Therefore, even in a situation where the “knowing participa-
tion” is satisfied in reality, it would still nonetheless be difficult 
to prove in the courtroom.  
Similarly, in Rural Metro, the Court posed a similar 
scenario by stating that “[i]f the third party knows that the 
board is breaching its duty of care and participates in the breach 
by misleading the board or creating the informational vacuum, 
then the third party can be liable for aiding and abetting.”97 
Again, this is the Court’s hypothetical scenario in which the in-
vestment banker is aware the director is breaching their fiduci-
ary duties to the shareholders and actively assists the director. 
In this situation, liability for aiding and abetting logically fol-
lows so long as it could be proven that collusion occurred.  
However, the board of directors typically turns to in-
vestment bankers to assure they satisfy their fiduciary duties—
not to help them breach their fiduciary duties. The directors 
and senior management under the directors are typically not 
M&A experts, so they rely on investment bankers “for expert 
advice about market conditions and alternative modes of sale.”98 
 
 96.  See, e.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 448 (Del. Ch. 2012) 
(“[A]lthough Goldman has been named as an aider and abettor and it has substantial, some 
might say even government-insured, financial resources, it is difficult to prove an aiding and 
abetting claim.”). 
 97.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 97 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 98.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 12. 
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The board of a selling company seeks help from investment 
bankers not only in whether to sell the company, but also what 
to sell, how to sell, who to sell it to, and how much to sell it 
for.99 With the board under fiduciary obligations to the compa-
ny and shareholders, there is typically enough to deter the di-
rectors from engaging in fraudulent behavior exemplified above 
and inviting the investment banker to help them along. There-
fore, the situation in these hypothetical scenarios is not the par-
ticular type of investment banker behavior that needs proper at-
tention because it rarely—if ever—occurs with such simplicity 
and surety. 
The more common context in practice, as evidenced through 
the recent case law, is where the investment banker’s disloyalty 
derives solely from his personal desire to finance the deal, ab-
sent the director’s breach of fiduciary duties. For instance, in 
Del Monte, the Court of Chancery explicitly acknowledged 
that in that instance, the taint of self-interest came from a con-
flicted financial advisor rather than from management; it was 
“fraud upon the board.”100 
Therefore, although Tuch’s argument is flawed in cate-
gorizing investment bankers as “fiduciaries,” Tuch is correct in 
contending that the optimal deterrence theory is not achieved 
by aiding and abetting. If the investment banker gets a percent-
age of the deal on which they are advising, which is usually the 
case,101 the payout for the banker is immense. This is why bank-
ers are incentivized to encourage a deal regardless if it is a good 
deal for the corporation in the first place. In order for the dis-
loyal bankers to be sufficiently deterred, they must expect to 
bear liability equal to the social costs they create. If the invest-
 
 99.  See id. (“Transaction planning has only just begun with an affirmative answer to the 
question as to ‘whether’ to sell.”). 
 100.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 836 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 101.  See Tuch, supra note 2, at 1097 (“[Investment bankers’] fees are typically calculated 
as a percentage of the deal consideration, often between 0.5% and 1.0%, contingent on the 
contemplated deal closing.”). 
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ment banker knows the complaining party almost never satisfies 
the test for aiding and abetting liability or knows the complain-
ing party is almost never able to prove knowing participation, 
the investment banker will determine—as they currently do—
that the benefit of a large payday in the tens of millions of dol-
lars substantially outweighs the minor risk of liability. 
 
B. Reputational Governance Alone is Insufficient 
 
The aiding and abetting approach is not the proper so-
lution to deter investment banker disloyalty—but something 
must be done, because leaving the market alone and allowing 
the threat of reputational harm to govern will not deter this 
wrongful behavior either. Some argue that the force of market 
discipline will sufficiently deter investment bankers from en-
gaging in disloyal conduct. The argument assumes that once 
the banker gives self-interested advice to one corporate director 
and the corporation suffers, other corporate directors will re-
frain from obtaining that banker’s advice.102 However, this as-
sumption is flawed. As stated and evidenced above, the invest-
ment banking market is increasingly shifting away from the 
focus of personal relationships and more towards the focus of 
monetary gain.103 Therefore, the field’s high turnover rates not 
only undercut the fiduciary argument, but also undercut the 
sufficiency of reputational governance. And even though repu-
tation should generally serve as a constraint to conflicted be-
havior, there are times when it does not. In fact, “[s]ome bank-
ers apparently believe that their clients won’t hold problematic 
 
 102.  See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, Determining Price Inadequacy with Neutral 
Decision Making and Expert Assistance: A Principled Way to “Just Say No”, 16 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 57, 92 n.159 (1991) (“‘[A] professional reputation for quality work is an important asset to an 
investment bank’, so bankers are reluctant to jeopardize this reputation by doing low quality 
work.”) (quoting Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are 
They and What Can Be Done About It?, DUKE L.J., 27, 43 (1989)). 
 103.  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 64, at 89–90 (explaining that there is now less empha-
sis in hiring prospective investment bankers on connections and charisma, and more emphasis 
on what he or she can do with his or her knowledge to make money). 
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behavior against them—or even, that some sorts of problematic 
behavior are a sign of intelligence and skill.”104 And even when a 
banker is performing badly, rather than the market disciplining 
the banker into behaving, the banker is often tempted “to sell 
bad investments to credulous but technically ‘sophisticated’ 
customers and clients” or to “doubl[e] down on, or not fully 
disclos[e], risk.”105 
Banks do invest in their reputation and goodwill, so it 
should follow that banks and bankers:  
“would not opine that a transaction were fair if it were 
not so, and to a certain extent, we do see banks and 
bankers refuse to issue fairness opinions when the of-
fered consideration is not fair. However, such refusals 
are the exception, not the rule, because incentives lead 
rational bankers to opine that a transaction is fair even 
when it may not be fair.”106 
There is a low likelihood that the market will detect a 
low-quality fairness opinion, so concern for reputation provides 
a poor discipline. “[M]arket discipline is a crude measure for 
constraining misconduct, especially for difficult-to-detect con-
flicts of interest. Information about past conduct by individual 
M&A advisors may not be widely disseminated, and even where 
it is, it may not allow a reliable assessment of a bank’s perfor-
mance.”107 Therefore, “rational bankers will issue low-quality 
opinions more willingly.”108 Fairness opinions are typically two 
pages that disclose a conclusion but offer “scant analysis,” and 
what analysis is contained may be “obscured through the use of 
‘abstract, oblique, general language.’”109 Therefore, it is hard 
for future clients to detect a good fairness opinion from a poor 
 
 104.  Id. at 2–3. 
 105.  Id. at 20. 
 106.  Steven J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral Analysis of Investment Bankers 
When Delivering Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 299, 308 (2006). 
 107.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1109. 
 108.  Cleveland, supra note 106. 
 109.  Id. at 308–09 (quoting DALE ARTHUR OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 15 (1999)). 
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one—or if a fairness opinion has been tainted with disloyalty—
so reputation is a weak discipline for investment bankers. 
Even if there are reputational motivations that could 
keep the investment bankers in line, the vast monetary 
incentive is most likely much stronger. “Bankers act as 
they do because they are rewarded for doing so. Those 
rewards include money, but they also include status, im-
proved professional prospects, and presumably, a sense 
of pride and achievement.”110 “In traditional investment 
banking, the business model assumed that revenue 
would come from repeat interaction with customers. In 
order for a bank to be successful, reputational capital 
was as important as financial capital.”111 Nearly twenty 
years later, former Goldman Sachs vice president Greg 
Smith stated, “To put the problem in the simplest 
terms, the interests of the client continue to be sidelined 
in the way the firm operates and thinks about making 
money . . . It’s purely about how we can make the most 
possible money off of them. If you were an alien from 
Mars and sat in on one of these meetings, you would be-
lieve that a client’s success or progress was not part of 
the thought process at all.”112  
Simply put, reputation is not enough—contract law is the prop-
er fix for this harmful problem. 
 
C. Contractual Governance is Preferable  
 
The Court of Chancery “upholds the freedom of con-
tract and enforces as a matter of fundamental public policy the 
voluntary agreements of sophisticated parties.”113 Where aiding 
and abetting is often difficult to enforce and therefore leaves 
investment bankers under-deterred from administering self-
serving advice, the court enforces contracts with high regard. 
 
 110.  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 64, at 108–09. 
 111.  Id. at 101. 
 112.  Id. at 102–03. 
 113.  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 840 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (citing NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2009)). 
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Contract law is, and should remain, the proper remedy for in-
vestment banker disloyalty—there is neither a need nor a rea-
son to bring in civil aiding and abetting. 
The Court of Chancery continually protects the board 
from unreasonable liability on the theory that the protection 
promotes shareholder interests.114 It is unreasonable—due to 
the difficulty and the expense of monitoring costs—to hold the 
director liable for breaching the Revlon duties for failure to 
monitor the investment banker. Directors cannot easily moni-
tor the advising investment bankers like an employer can easily 
monitor an employee, so it would be unfair and illogical to im-
pose the same vicarious liability onto two different circum-
stances.115 Additionally, “directors are entitled to rely on the 
advice of [experts such as investment bankers] as long as they 
believe that the advice was within the expert’s professional 
competence, the expert was selected with reasonable care, and 
reliance is in good faith.”116 Therefore, directors should be pro-
tected in this context because of the near-impossibility of suffi-
ciently monitoring the investment banker, and because they are 
entitled to rely on the investment banker. In other words, di-
rectors should not be held liable for failing to sufficiently moni-
tor the investment banker or relying on the banker’s advice in 
good faith. The liability should fall where the fault is—with the 
self-serving investment banker—but the director should con-
tract for the protection by negotiating an engagement letter fa-
 
 114.  See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (reason-
ing that “it is in the shareholders’ economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors 
from liability. . . .”). 
 115.  Tuch, supra note 2, at 1124–25. 
 116.  Alexandros N. Rokas, Reliance on Experts from a Corporate Law Prospective, 2 
AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 323, 323 (2013); see also 8 Del. C. § 141(e) (“A member of the board of 
directors . . . in the performance of such member’s duties, be fully protected in relying in good 
faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or 
statements presented to the corporation by any of the corporation’s officers of employees, or 
committees of the board of directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reason-
ably believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has 
been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation.”). 
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vorable to the director’s corporation. Specifically, the director 
should contract for indemnification.  
Indemnification means providing “security against hurt, 
loss, or damage” or an exemption from “incurred penalties or 
liability.”117 Section 145 of DGCL provides an allowance for di-
rector indemnification by the corporation,118 so director in-
demnification is not a novel idea that remains unknown as to 
whether the courts will enforce it or not. But director indemni-
fication has limits, as it should. DGCL § 145 only allows in-
demnification of the director if the director did not contribute 
to the disloyalty.119 The director must meet the proper stand-
ards of conduct (i.e., duty of loyalty or care).120 DGCL § 145 al-
so provides several different ways to determine whether the di-
rector did in fact meet his or her standards of conduct.121 
Director indemnification is already a recognized and of-
ten-implemented provision in corporate charters. It is not a 
new or controversial idea like some of the scholars’ proposi-
tions.122 Indemnification is a tool that keeps directors’ self-
serving behavior in check because they know as long as they 
perform in good faith and succeed in litigation, they will not be 
responsible for fees. In other words, as long as they do not 
 
 117.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/indemnity. 
 118.  8 Del. C. § 145(c) (“To the extent that a present or former director or officer of a 
corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action, suit or pro-
ceeding . . . or in defense of any claim, [or] issue . . . such person shall be indemnified against 
expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred by such person in connec-
tion therewith.”). 
 119.  See generally 8 Del. C. § 145. 
 120.  See Section II of this paper for further details on director breach of care and loyalty 
duties. 
 121.  8 Del. C. § 145(d) (providing that it may be determined whether or not the director 
met his or her standards of conduct in a number of ways, including, “(1) By a majority vote of 
the directors who are not parties to such action, suit or proceeding, even though less than a 
quorum; or (2) By a committee of such directors designated by majority vote of such directors, 
even though less than a quorum; or (3) If there are no such directors, or if such directors so di-
rect, by independent legal counsel in a written opinion; or (4) By the stockholders.”). 
 122.  For instance, Tuch admits that his suggestion of subjecting M&A advisors to prima-
ry liability through direct causes of actions by shareholders for disloyalty is a more controversial 
suggestion. Tuch, supra note 2, at 1085. 
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breach their duty of loyalty,123 they will not have to worry about 
paying for litigation that may come against them. At the same 
time, it does not create a scenario in which directors become 
excessively risk-averse due to fear of liability, which in turn 
promotes shareholders’ interests.124 
The same idea and rationale could easily be applied to 
the context of a corporate director seeking advice from an in-
vestment banker. The investment banker could agree contrac-
tually to indemnify the director in the event the director is sub-
ject to a derivative lawsuit and the court finds the director did 
not act in bad faith. For example, the engagement letter be-
tween the bank and the director, instead of containing boiler-
plate language favorable to the bank and banker, should include 
a provision similar to that provided in DGCL § 145 that states 
if it is determined that the banker administered self-serving ad-
vice that caused the director of the company whom it is advis-
ing to incur costs in defending the action or to pay damages in 
relation to the action, and it is also determined that the director 
is not also culpable, the banker will indemnify the director for 
any legal expenses or damages incurred in that action. The par-
ticular parties could choose the method of determining whether 
the investment banker and director were disloyal. It is probably 
preferable that the court determine whether or not the director 
qualifies for indemnification by the investment banker, but just 
like DGCL § 145(d) provides, it could also be determined by a 
committee of independent directors, independent outside legal 
counsel, etc.—whatever is most preferable to the specific par-
ties. The parties could also choose what specific fees are to be 
covered, specific procedures and time frames, etc. Therefore, in 
 
 123.  As noted above, the Court of Chancery has determined that good faith is a subsidi-
ary element of the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 124.  See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) (reason-
ing that “it is in the shareholders’ economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors 
from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical matter, there 
is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal proceduralist standards of attention, 
they can face liability as a result of a business loss.”). 
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cases similar to Del Monte where the court recognizes there 
has been “fraud upon the board”125 and the court finds that the 
board did not engage in wrongful behavior other than seeking 
advice from a self-serving investment banker for which there 
was no way the director could have known, the investment 
banker will be held liable for the expenses the director incurred 
in defending the action.  
This indemnification clause not only protects the incul-
pable director but also promotes shareholders’ interests. It is in 
the shareholders’ best interest to allow the board to engage in 
appropriate risk taking without the fear of liability. This is why 
the court and legislature shields the board from liability time 
and time again, such as through the implementation of the 
business judgment rule and statutory protections such as the al-
lowance of exculpatory provisions, director indemnification, 
and director and officer insurance.126 Therefore, it is clear that 
encouraging directors to make decisions without the fear of lia-
bility is important. It is also important that directors seek out-
side advice when negotiating or contemplating a high-stakes 
corporate deal. If directors know that they will be on the hook 
for the investment bankers’ disloyal conduct should the deal 
turn out badly, as aiding and abetting is nearly impossible to 
prove and impose, directors may be discouraged from turning 
to investment bankers. This inhibits the directors from ful-
filling their fiduciary duties to the highest extent. 
An indemnification clause between the banker and the 
director will also promote shareholders’ interests by keeping 
the director’s self-serving behavior in check. The remedy for 
indemnification would fall short in a scenario—as in, for exam-
 
 125.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 836 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1989)). 
 126.  See Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052–53 (business judgment rule); 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) 
(exculpatory clause); 8 Del. C. § 145(c) (director indemnification); 8 Del. C. § 145(g) (director 
and officer insurance). 
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ple, El Paso127—where it is clear both the investment banker 
and the director were acting in their own self-interest. But an 
indemnification clause would make that situation highly unlike-
ly. Just as the corporation-director indemnification clause in 
the Delaware Code incentivizes the board to act in good 
faith,128 this indemnification clause would do the same. The 
courts will certainly support enforcing a remedy that promotes 
shareholders’ interests. In Rural Metro, the court stated, “[T]he 
directors’ fiduciary duties require that they seek ‘to promote 
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockhold-
ers.”129 “Stockholders’ best interest must always, within legal 
limits, be the end. Other [corporate] constituencies may be 
considered only instrumentally to advance that end.”130 The in-
demnification clause is in line with shareholder’s interests, both 
in that it protects the board from unreasonable liability and in-
centivizes the board to act loyally so they can be indemnified; 
accordingly, indemnification is a proper solution. 
This indemnification approach is also consistent with 
the principles of equity and fairness. An indemnification that 
imposes liability onto the banker only when the director is not 
also at fault is fair. The court in Del Monte explicitly recog-
nized and stated that “it appears that the Board sought in good 
faith to fulfill its fiduciary duties, but failed because it was mis-
led by Barclays.”131 It is entirely unjust to impose liability on the 
board that put forth all efforts to fulfill its duty of loyalty simply 
because the market has constructed a shield around the invest-
ment banker in which liability cannot seem to find a logical 
 
 127.  See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 56 (“El Paso turns up the heat several 
notches. Here the board and the banker made the moves indicated in the conflict-management 
playbook. . . .”). 
 128.  8 Del. C. § 145. 
 129.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (quot-
ing eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010)). 
 130.  Id. at 80 (quoting Leo E. Strine Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that 
For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.34 (2012)). 
 131.  In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 818 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
WORLEY.FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2018  2:47 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 32 
184 
hook. Of course, there are instances where the board is not so 
innocent, but in those cases the indemnification clause would 
not apply as a protection. In a scenario like Del Monte, the in-
demnification will place liability where it equitably should be 
while not putting an unjust burden on the investment banker 
(i.e., forcing the investment banker to be strictly liable for com-
pany losses). The court will certainly appreciate this rationale 
because, as mentioned above, the court rightfully takes ad-
vantage of any opportunity to protect board members from lia-
bility if they act in good faith. 
Of course, contractual governance is a privately ordered 
solution. In other words, both the banker and the director must 
mutually agree to include the indemnification provision in the 
engagement letter. One might inquire as to why directors have 
not already pursued this remedy. The answer is that the market 
is currently dysfunctional. The first problem is that “one of the 
first agreements that the principals in a business transaction ex-
ecute—one that materially affects their respective rights—has 
been neglected: investment banking engagement letters.”132 
Normally, the investment banker attempts to start the relation-
ship with the director seeking its help on behalf of its company 
“with [a] ‘standard form’ engagement letter, which is always 
one-sided in favor of the investment banker.”133 Thus, there is 
an issue with the director not putting forth enough care to ne-
gotiate for more favorable terms, the investment banker having 
too high of bargaining power, or a combination of both. An-
other problem within the market, which possibly relates to the 
issue of unequal bargaining power, is that investment banks will 
not want to agree to indemnify the director—in fact, limiting 
 
 132.  Louis R. Dienes & Alison M. Pear, An Annotated Form of Investment Banking En-
gage-
ment Letter, 25 CAL. BUS. L. PRACTITIONER 108, 108 (2010), http://www.kelrun.com/files/20
13/05/Pear_AnnInvesLtr.pdf. 
 133.  Richard Harroch, Negotiating Investment Banker Engagement Letters, FORBES 
(June 24, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/06/24/negotiating-
investment-banker-engagement-letters/#10999fbcb62d. 
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indemnification liability is probably one of the banker’s main 
objectives when engaging in a business relationship.134 The 
bank and bankers want the company and directors to indemnify 
them.  
Historically, when the market’s functionality fails, 
America has turned to a government solution—particularly in 
the banking market.135 But it is difficult for Congress to control 
bank and banker behavior. For instance, investment bankers of-
ten have a vast amount of resources “to figure out both how to 
comply minimally or only facially with regulations and how to 
complicate regulatory efforts to get them to comply more max-
imally.”136 Additionally, bankers often construct methods to 
“help their clients get around regulations” and often “hire law-
yers, accountants, and other advisors to help them get around 
regulations.”137 Furthermore, there are also limitations on what 
state and local regulation can do to improve investment banker 
activity. For instance, if the bank does not like a state’s particu-
lar laws, they can simply move their transactions to a different 
state.138 This threat usually disincentivizes states from imposing 
further regulations than federal law.139 
There comes a point where government ordered solu-
tions, whether at the state or federal level, only further compli-
cate the system without actually solving the problems. A pri-
vately ordered solution of contracting for indemnification will 
work better to target the current market dysfunction and deter 
disloyal investment banker behavior. Making the change within 
 
 134.  See Dienes & Pear, supra note 132, at 109 (“The investment banker’s major objec-
tives will include: (1) defining the type of transaction for which it is being engaged broadly, so 
that the client’s liability for payment of the banker’s fee is triggered easily; (2) defining the ex-
clusivity of its services as broadly as possible; (3) limiting the circumstances that allow the client 
to avoid paying its fee; and (4) limiting indemnification liability.”). 
 135.  See, e.g., HILL & PAINTER, supra note 64, at 127 (stating that “[b]ankers’ conduct in 
the U.S. has been regulated at the federal and state levels for a long time.”). 
 136.  Id. at 128. 
 137.  Id. at 134. 
 138.  Id. at 140. 
 139.  Id. 
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the engagement letters puts the individual directors and bank-
ers at the battlefront. The engagement letter is not a complex 
set of rules or abstract principles that are unclear or avoidable—
it is a contract in which the investment banker is personally in-
volved and to which the investment banker will be much more 
inclined to adhere. It requires the director to exercise care and 
effort in negotiating a fair engagement letter rather than simply 
signing and agreeing to boilerplate language favorable to the 
bank. Additionally, it allows the parties to tailor the contract to 
their needs, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all, government-
ordered solution.140 
The question still remains as to how and why the banks 
and the bankers would agree to indemnify the corporate direc-
tors, especially if the banks have higher bargaining power. One 
option, notwithstanding the shortcomings of implementing 
regulations stated above, is to require banks that are publicly 
held companies subject to the U.S. securities law filing re-
quirements to disclose to the banks’ shareholders the specifics 
of indemnification agreements between their advising bankers 
and corporate directors, and if they have not implemented such 
agreements, require banks to explain the reason why.141 Just as 
the indemnification clause promotes the interests of the advice-
seeking company’s shareholders, it similarly promotes the in-
terests of the bank’s shareholders; once it becomes known as a 
useful deterrent for self-serving and overly risky investment 
bankers, the bank’s shareholders will certainly want to see it in-
cluded. This could operate as a market discipline for the banks 
because if shareholders are unhappy, they can sell their inter-
ests, resulting in a decrease of the bank’s share price. There-
 
 140.  See, e.g., HILL & PAINTER, supra note 64, at 147 (stating that requiring the parties 
to enter into a “covenant” as opposed to voluntary adoption would have to be specified by 
means of a minimum standard, which would not be preferable because one size cannot be ex-
pected to fit all). 
 141.  See id. at 148–49 (explaining a similar SEC filing requirement to incentivize banks 
to adopt personal liability agreements for their highly compensated bankers). 
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fore, “[s]uch required disclosure might help motivate more 
banks to adopt such agreements.”142 
For banks that are not publicly held corporations and 
therefore not subject to federal securities law, even if such a re-
quirement described above could not be adopted or enforced, 
the motivation to implement an indemnification clause can still 
occur through the negotiations of the individual parties. Nego-
tiations are most optimal if both parties are willing to grant 
concessions, so even competitive negotiators must give them-
selves room to concede.143 Therefore, if the director starts the 
bargain higher than his target point, the banker is likely to 
agree to the indemnification provision once the director con-
cedes higher demands. The most favorable terms the director 
could realistically negotiate for himself and his corporation is 
an indemnification of damages arising “‘primarily’ or ‘principal-
ly’ from [the] investment bankers’ actions.”144 However, be-
cause that essentially means the investment banker just has to 
be found slightly more liable than the director, it is likely that 
neither the bank nor banker will agree to hold the banker solely 
liable when both the banker and director were at fault to some 
degree.145 Therefore, the director could start the negotiation 
with the primary and principal liability language and subse-
quently concede to an indemnification of damages arising solely 
from the investment bankers’ actions. The director also has 
room in negotiating the method of how liability is determined. 
If the banker is truly unwilling to agree to indemnify the direc-
tor, at the minimum, the director should put a halt on indemni-
 
 142.  Id. at 148. 
 143.  DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 57, 151 
(2d ed. 2007) (stating that the highest degree of satisfaction is achieved if the parties solve prob-
lems in a way that will “satisfy both their underlying interests” and that “[e]ven negotiators us-
ing mostly competitive tactics . . . find it necessary to make concessions.”). 
 144.  See Dienes & Pear, supra note 132, at 112 (explaining that it is challenging for a 
client to contract for indemnification at a lower standard than if the investment banker is “pri-
marily” or “principally” liable). 
 145.  Id. 
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fying the investment bank or banker and likewise refuse to in-
clude that language. As Arthur Rosenbloom explains, 
[T]he conduct of an investment banker cannot be 
truly objective if he is both indemnified and get-
ting a bonus if the deal goes through. Who 
would respect an audited financial statement if 
the auditor had an indemnification from the 
company to the effect that if there was anything 
negligent, false or misleading in the financial 
statements, the auditor would not be responsi-
ble?146 
 
Then, as a last resort, if the banker refuses to agree to 
both indemnify the director and to omit his or her own indem-
nification provision, the director should seek advice from a dif-
ferent bank. These several options give the director leverage, 
which helps mend the market dysfunction of unequal bargain-
ing power. This also creates market discipline for the invest-
ment banker because he or she will be incentivized to reach 
some agreement when the banker knows he or she will lose the 
director’s business and the potential payout of an M&A deal if 
he fails to.  
To be taken seriously and eventually reach an agreement 
of indemnification, the director cannot be greedy and bargain 
for an unreasonable indemnification. For example, if the direc-
tor tries to hold the investment banker responsible for the cor-
porate losses of any deal gone wrong for which he or she ad-
vised, if the bank and banker agreed to that, the banker would 
certainly think twice before advising the director to take the 
deal when it is in fact a poor deal. However, that punishment 
would be far too unreasonable. First, neither a bank nor a 
banker would ever agree to include that provision in the en-
 
 146.  Arthur H. Rosenbloom, Investment Banker Liability: A Panel Discussion, 16 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 557, 570 (1991). 
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gagement letter. And even if they did or were somehow forced 
to, it would rarely be clear as to when a company suffered losses 
solely because of the investment banker’s advice. Therefore, to 
hold the investment banker strictly liable would be highly un-
fair. Just like corporate directors, it is good if investment bank-
ers engage in some risk—just not excessive or careless risk. Fur-
thermore, investment bankers typically have deep pockets, but 
not deep enough to cover large corporate losses. And if the 
banks were the parties that end up absorbing the indemnifica-
tion, the result would again be under-deterred behavior, as the 
bankers would then be hiding behind the deep-pocketed bank.  
However, an indemnification for legal fees incurred by 
the director when the investment banker is disloyal and the di-
rector fulfills his fiduciary duties is reasonable. Court fees can 
be extremely expensive, so they are enough to make the invest-
ment banker second-guess before administering bad advice, but 
they are not so large that there is no realistic ability to pay. If 
one can competently defend the assertion that banks should 
force their bankers to sign personal guarantees in which these 
highly paid bankers are asked to make a substantial portion of 
their personal assets available to pay the debts of the bank if it 
fails,147 or investment bankers should be subject to primary lia-
bility through direct causes of actions by the shareholders148 
(which the Court of Chancery has specifically rejected be-
fore),149 it is certainly reasonable to claim that the advising in-
vestment banker can pay the director’s court fees for litigation 
that the investment banker caused from self-interested advice. 
The limit on the imposition of fees only where the director has 
indeed satisfied his or her duties as director and the cap on just 
the legal fees the director incurs in defending the action cabins 
the bank exposure, making the potential liability reasonable. 
 
 147.  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 64, at 152. 
 148.  See Tuch, supra note 2, at 1085 (emphasis added). 
 149.  Bratton & Wachter, supra note 4, at 33. 
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Where the realities of how the market operates undercut 
both the fiduciary argument and the reputational governance 
argument, it could be argued that it also undercuts the plausi-
bility of contractual governance. Often in practice, “bankers 
and their clients do not use their contracts to minimize conflicts 
and improve incentives. . . .”150 But, they should. It is generally 
true that no contract is complete, which is why state corporate 
law implemented fiduciary duties in the first place—to operate 
as a gap-filler and impose the duty of loyalty and liability for 
breach thereof even absent a contract. But in the M&A context 
where the stakes are high and the potential losses detrimental, 
the parties should put forth the effort to create contracts that 
are as complete as possible. Although this could arguably in-
crease transaction costs, adding this indemnification provision 
into (or as an exhibit to) the contract will not unreasonably in-
crease the costs. For example, DGCL § 102(b)(7) technically 
puts the burden of transaction costs on incorporators by requir-
ing them to explicitly include an exculpatory provision in the 
charter if the parties desire one.151 But that provision is so 
common that it is nearly always in the charter or bylaws and is 
not increasing transaction costs.152 
An indemnification clause in the investment banker-
director engagement letter would operate the same way once it 
became evident that such a contract provision deters both in-
vestment banker and director disloyalty as well as promotes 
shareholders’ interests. This would especially be true if a disclo-
sure requirement were implemented. But even if at first the 
clause required some extensive negotiation between the direc-
tor and investment banker, it would soon become boilerplate 
 
 150.  Id. at 26. 
 151.  8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) (“[T]he certificate of incorporation may also contain any or all 
of the following matters:  . . . A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a di-
rector to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty 
as a director. . . .”). 
 152.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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language that is simply copied and pasted from the past en-
gagement letter into the next. Even if the transaction costs are 
slightly increased due to the inability to settle on the terms of 
the indemnification, the additional costs of the transaction are 
still going to be significantly lower than the cost of economic 
damage in engaging in a bad deal in the million- or billion-
dollar range due to the investment banker’s self-serving advice 




The Court of Chancery correctly states, “The threat of 
liability helps incentivize gatekeepers to provide sound advice, 
monitor clients, and deter client wrongs.”153 But it is clear that 
holding investment bankers liable for aiding and abetting cor-
porate directors in breaching their fiduciary duties does not suf-
ficiently incentivize loyalty, leaving the self-serving behavior 
under-deterred. The stringent test for aiding and abetting can-
not be satisfied. Liability for aiding and abetting requires four 
elements to be met before liability attaches: (1) the existence of 
a fiduciary relationship; (2) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty; (3) 
knowing participation in that breach by the defendants; and (4) 
damages proximately caused the breach.154 There is no fiduciary 
relationship in the context of an investment banker, so elements 
(1) and (2) cannot therefore be met. And even if there was a fi-
duciary relationship with fiduciary duties imposed, the “know-
ing participation” requirement is nearly impossible to prove in 
all but very limited scenarios. Investment bankers who advise 
and close deals that earn them fees in the tens of millions of 
dollars are governed by a test that can rarely, if ever, apply. The 
test is a simple cost-benefit analysis done by the investment 
 
 153.  In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 88 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 154.  See, e.g., In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 838 (Del. Ch. 
2011) (citing Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001)). 
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banker who undoubtedly understands economics. The typical 
results will certainly not discourage self-serving advice.  
The economic damage that investment banker disloyalty 
causes corporations demonstrates the importance of finding a 
solution. It is clear that finding a solution to investment banker 
disloyalty that creates sufficient deterrence and does not unrea-
sonably increase transaction costs is a difficult task. But an in-
demnification clause in or incorporated as a part of the en-
gagement letter between the investment bank and the corporate 
director seeking advice is a reasonable and desirable solution. 
Director indemnification is already a recognized practice in the 
Delaware statutes and courts, and it can easily be transitioned 
to apply in this context. It will promote shareholders’ interests 
by both shielding the board from liability when it has only 
sought advice from a self-serving advisor, and incentivizing the 
directors to perform in good faith and fulfill the duty of loyalty 
so they may qualify for indemnification. The indemnification 
clause approach also promotes principles of fairness and equity 
by not holding the wrong party responsible for large expenses 
in defending an action. 
With the complexity and amounts of government or-
dered solutions and regulations, a privately ordered solution is 
preferable to target the problem, create a sufficient deterrent, 
and mend the market dysfunction. The directors will be forced 
to put forth more effort into the engagement letter with the 
bank than they historically have and negotiate for indemnifica-
tion, but it is probable that the banks and bankers will agree 
when the indemnification is only for situations where the fault 
lies solely with the investment banker’s self-interested advice. 
This limit on the director’s qualification for indemnification 
renders it reasonable while still imposing liability large enough 
to sufficiently deter the investment banker from advising the di-
rector to proceed with a bad deal in order to simply get a pay-
day. Furthermore, contracting for indemnification will not un-
reasonably increase transaction costs because if it is successful, 
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it will become boilerplate language in the banker-director con-
tract, just as DGCL § 145 indemnification clauses and DGCL 
§ 102(b)(7) exculpatory clauses are boilerplate provisions in 
corporate charters and bylaws. Contract law—not civil aiding 
and abetting—is the proper place to turn for sufficient deter-
rence.  
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